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STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
vs. 
GARY L. BOUCK, 
De f endant/Appe11ant. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Case No. 900122-CA 
COMES NOW the Defendant, Gary L. Bouck, by and through his 
lawyer of record, L. Long, and enters the following Brief on 
Appeal: 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Section 78-2a-3(2)(d) of Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended, 
confers jurisdiction upon the Court of Appeals over Appeals 
taken from the Circuit Courts. This Appeal is from a final 
Judgment entered in the Third Circuit Court, Layton Department 
#892003830 TC, Judge Roger S. Dutson, wherein the 
Defendant/Appellant was convicted of driving under the influence 
of alcohol. Defendant was tried by a jury and convicted of 
Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol, in violation of section 
41-6-44 of the Utah Criminal Code on February 7, 1990. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Prosecution failed to identify the Defendant during trial,. 
2. Is sitting at the counsel table during trial and during 
identification of the alleged offender unduly suggestive. 
3. The prosecutor presented insufficient evidence to convict 
Gary L. Bouck for Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol. 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT #6 
In all criminal prosecution, the accused shall enjoy the 
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the 
State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, 
which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and 
to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be 
confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory 
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the 
Assistance of Counsel for his defense. 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT #14, SECTION 1 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States and 
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United 
States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make 
or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or 
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction 
the equal protection of the laws. 
UTAH CONSTITUTION, ARTICLE 1. SECTION 12 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right 
to appear and defend in person and by counsel, to demand the 
nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a copy 
thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the 
witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to compel the 
attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy 
public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in 
which the offense is alleged to have been committed, and the 
right to appeal in all cases. In no instance shall any accused 
person, before final judgement, be compelled to advance money or 
fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall 
not be compelled to give evidence against himself; a wife shall 
not be compelled to testify against her husband, nor a husband 
against his wife, nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy 
for the same offense. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On or about the 16th day of July, 1989, at approximately 1:20 
a.m., Officer Cady, of the Utah Highway Patrol, discovered a 
disabled vehicle positioned in the center divider, completely off 
the paved portion of roadway at or near SR-15 and Burton in Davis 
County, Utah. The officer did not observe any driving pattern, 
nor was there any indication of the amount of time the vehicle 
had been at that location. 
The occupant of the vehicle was asleep when the officer 
approached the car, the engine was off, and the occupant had a 
set of keys in his hand. Officer Cady woke the occupant, and 
subsequently arrested him for violating Section 41-6-44 of the 
Utah Code, wherein the Defendant allegedly did operate and/or 
have actual physical control of a motor vehicle while under the 
influence of alcohol and/or drugs to a degree which rendered 
him incapable of safely driving said vehicle. 
SUMMARY OF flRCTMEWT 
The Appellant argues three basic points in his appeal• 
First, the prosecution failed to properly identify the Defendant 
during the trial on February 7, 1990 at 10:00 a.m.. This is an 
flagrant violation of the Defendant's right to due process. 
Since the person sitting next to defense counsel was never 
identified as the Defendant, it was only assumed that the person 
sitting next to the defense attorney was Mr. Gary L. Bouck. 
Defendant was never arraigned on the crimes for which he was 
charged, and therefore, the Court did not know who Gary L. Bouck 
was. 
Second, the circumstances under which the Defendant may have 
been identified were at most circumstantial and at the least 
unduly suggestive. Circumstances such as these tend to increase 
the risk of misidentification and are unreliable. 
Third, given that the prosecutor did not identify Defendant at 
trial, the prosecutor provided insufficient evidence for 
conviction of Gary L. Bouck. For these reasons the defendant 
moves this Court to reverse Defendant's conviction on the grounds 
surraaarized above and expanded upon below. 
ARGUMENT 
POIMT I 
DID OFFICER CADY PROPERLY IDENTIFY THE DEFENDANT AS THE 
PERSON GUILTY OF DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ALCOHOL? 
An individual's right to a fair jury trial is protected and 
guaranteed by the Utah and United States Constitutions, Article 1 
section 12, and Amendments 6 and 14 respectively. Prosecution 
bears the burden of establishing beyond a reasonable doubt the 
identity of the accused as the person who committed the offense. 
In the instant case during the jury trial the arresting officer 
failed to identify the Defendant as the person guilty of the 
alleged offenses. The trial court erred in its decision to 
convict the Defendant by not recognizing the failure of the 
prosecution to provide a specific in-court identification of the 
Defendant. Thus, Defendant contends the trial court improperly 
entered judgment and sentence upon him. In State v. Hill, 520 
P.2d 618 (Wash 1974), it was determined that "it is axiomatic in 
criminal trials that the prosecution bears the burden of 
establishing beyond a reasonable doubt the identity of the 
accused as the person who committed the offense." 
In the case at bar, the trial transcript, exhibit "A", 
indicates that the defendant was never identified by the 
prosecution as the man in the car at the time of Officer Cady's 
arrest. Therefore the jury could not conclude beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the man seated next to the lawyer at 
counsel table was in fact the same man that was allegedly guilty 
of driving under the influence of alcohol. In examining the 
Defendant's driver's license, Officer Cady testified that the 
identity of the individual on the driver's license showed to be 
Gary L. Bouck. The prosecution erred at this moment in the 
trial, however, in that the officer never testified in court that 
the man seated next to the lawyer at counsel table was Gary L. 
Bouck. Officer Cady did state that the identity of the driver 
matched that of the person pictured on the driver's license, but 
failed to identify the man sitting next to counsel during the 
trial as Gary L. Bouck. Clearly, then, the Defendant's right to 
due process was infringed upon in that there was no specific 
identification at trial. 
It is a matter of well defined constitutional law that a 
criminal Defendant has a due process right to fair identification 
procedures. The Defendant submits that it is the primary concern 
of this Court is to protect a citizen's due process right to a 
fair identification procedure and that the identification be 
reliable. In the case State v. Myers. P.2d 1252, (Arizona 1977) 
it has been decided that "it is essential that totality of 
circumstances surrounding identification indicate defendant has 
not been mistakenly identified." Furthermore, Justice Hay 
commented in Myers, Id. at 1256, wherein he states: 
It is a well established rule of law that a criminal 
defendant has a due process right to a fair 
identification procedure. See e.g. United States v. 
Wade. 388 U.S. 218, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149 
(1967); State v. Dessureault, 104 
Ariz. 380, 453 P.2d 951, 104 Ariz. 439, 454 P.2d 981, 397 
U.S. 965, 90 S.Ct. 1000, 25 L.Ed.2d 257 (1970). The 
primary concern of the law is that the identification be 
reliable. It is essential that the totality of 
circumstances surrounding the identification indicate 
that the defendant has not been mistakenly identified. 
State v. Strickland. 113 Ariz.445, 556 P.2d 320 (1976); 
State v. Dessureault, supra. 
POINT II 
THE PROCEDURES USED TO IDENTIFY GARY L. BOUCK WERE UNDULY 
SUGGESTIVE 
The circumstances under which the Defendant was identified 
were circumstantial at best and were unduly suggestive. In the 
case Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, Justice Powell delivered the 
opinion of the Court; 
Some general guidelines emerge from these cases as 
to the relationship between suggestiveness and 
misidentification. It is first of all apparent that 
the primary evil to be avoided is a "very substantial 
likelihood of irreparable misidentification." Simmons 
v. United StatesP 390 U.S., at 384....Suggestive 
confrontations are disapproved because they increase 
the likelihood of misidentification, and unnecessarily 
suggestive ones are condemned for the further reason 
that the increased chance of misidentification is 
gratuitous. 
The Defendant was not directly identified by anyone at trial. 
As a matter of course, the Defendant will identify himself at his 
arraignment. In the instant case, however, there was no 
arraignment. Upon receiving counsel's Appearance, Judge Dutson 
set the matter for pre-trial and did not arraign the Defendant. 
The sole witness for the State did not specify that the person 
sitting at counsel table was Gary L. Bouck, the prosecutor did 
not point out to the Court or to the jury that the person sitting 
at the counsel table was Gary L. Bouck, and counsel for the 
defense did not specifically identify the person sitting at the 
counsel table as Gary L. Bouck. The circumstances under which 
the Defendant was identified were circumstantial at most, and 
unduly suggestive at the least. As has been stated in several 
cases, overly suggestive identification circumstances leads to a 
greater opportunity for misidentification and therefore denies 
the Defendant his due process right and prejudices him. 
POIHT III 
THE PROSECUTOR PRESENTED INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE FOR CONVICTION 
The evidence the Prosector presented at trial was insufficient 
to convict the Defendant. At no time was the person sitting at 
counsel table identified as Gary L. Bouck. It is fundamental law 
that the Defendant be present for his trial and have the 
opportunity to confront witnesses. In order for this to be 
achieved, the Defendant must be identified at trial and must have 
the opportunity to cross-examine witnesses against him. The only 
witness in this matter was the police officer who failed to 
specifically identify the person at counsel table as the Gary L. 
Bouck, and therefore, the evidence which the prosecution put 
before the Court was insufficient to convict Gary L. Bouck of 
Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol. 
CQWCIfPSIOIt 
In the instant case, three questions remain: 1. Did the 
prosecution identify the person sitting at counsel table as the 
Defendant; 2. Was the identification procedure used specific or 
was it entirely circumstantial and suggestive; and, 3. Was the 
evidence the prosecutor put before the presiding judge sufficient 
to convict Gary L. Bouck of Driving Under the Inluence. The 
prosecution at no time called any witnesses who identified the 
Defendant as Gary L. Bouck, did not identify the Defendant 
himself, and did not have the Court identify the Defendant. 
Under usual circumstances, the Defendant will identify himself at 
arraignment, but since the trial judge did not arraign Gary L. 
Bouck, but simply set a pre-trial date for him, the Defendant did 
not identify himself. 
Given the circumstances under which Gary L. Bouck was assumed 
to have been identified, that is, sitting with counsel at the 
counsel table during trial, it is obvious that the circumstances 
under which he was identified are at most circumstantial and at 
the least unduly suggestive. 
During the trial in this matter, the prosecution failed in its 
prima facie case to identify the person sitting at the counsel 
table as the Defendant. The Appellant submits that the 
prosecution failed in its prima facia case to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the person sitting at counsel table is the 
same person who was arrested for Driving Under the Influence, and 
therefore, presented insufficient evidence with which a 
conviction of Driving under the Inluence could be reached. The 
defendant contends that this conviction should be reversed on 
the grounds and for the reasons that he was not identified at 
trial, the circumstances under which he may have been identified 
were completely suggestive, and that the prosecution did not 
provide the Court with sufficient evidence with which a 
conviction may be reached. All these things, taken in their 
entirety have denied Gary L. Bouck his right to due process and 
have unfairly prejudiced his case. This case should be reversed 
as a matter of well defined law. 
THE PRICE OF FREEDOM IS CONSTANT VIGILANCE 
DATED this 31st day of May, 1990 
L-L 
L. Long 
Lawyer for Defendant/Appellant 
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